| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hidraw: fix data race on device refcount
The hidraw_open() function increments the hidraw device reference
counter. The counter has no dedicated synchronization mechanism,
resulting in a potential data race when concurrently opening a device.
The race is a regression introduced by commit 8590222e4b02 ("HID:
hidraw: Replace hidraw device table mutex with a rwsem"). While
minors_rwsem is intended to protect the hidraw_table itself, by instead
acquiring the lock for writing, the reference counter is also protected.
This is symmetrical to hidraw_release(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: safexcel - Cleanup ring IRQ workqueues on load failure
A failure loading the safexcel driver results in the following warning
on boot, because the IRQ affinity has not been correctly cleaned up.
Ensure we clean up the affinity and workqueues on a failure to load the
driver.
crypto-safexcel: probe of f2800000.crypto failed with error -2
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 232 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1913 free_irq+0x300/0x340
Modules linked in: hwmon mdio_i2c crypto_safexcel(+) md5 sha256_generic libsha256 authenc libdes omap_rng rng_core nft_masq nft_nat nft_chain_nat nf_nat nft_ct nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink fuse autofs4
CPU: 1 PID: 232 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G W 6.1.6-00002-g9d4898824677 #3
Hardware name: MikroTik RB5009 (DT)
pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : free_irq+0x300/0x340
lr : free_irq+0x2e0/0x340
sp : ffff800008fa3890
x29: ffff800008fa3890 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffff8000008e6dc0 x25: ffff000009034cac x24: ffff000009034d50
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 000000000000004a x21: ffff0000093e0d80
x20: ffff000009034c00 x19: ffff00000615fc00 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000075f5c1584c5e
x14: 0000000000000017 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000040
x11: ffff000000579b60 x10: ffff000000579b62 x9 : ffff800008bbe370
x8 : ffff000000579dd0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff000000579e18
x5 : ffff000000579da8 x4 : ffff800008ca0000 x3 : ffff800008ca0188
x2 : 0000000013033204 x1 : ffff000009034c00 x0 : ffff8000087eadf0
Call trace:
free_irq+0x300/0x340
devm_irq_release+0x14/0x20
devres_release_all+0xa0/0x100
device_unbind_cleanup+0x14/0x60
really_probe+0x198/0x2d4
__driver_probe_device+0x74/0xdc
driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x110
__driver_attach+0x8c/0x190
bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xc0
driver_attach+0x20/0x30
bus_add_driver+0x148/0x1fc
driver_register+0x74/0x120
__platform_driver_register+0x24/0x30
safexcel_init+0x48/0x1000 [crypto_safexcel]
do_one_initcall+0x4c/0x1b0
do_init_module+0x44/0x1cc
load_module+0x1724/0x1be4
__do_sys_finit_module+0xbc/0x110
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1c/0x24
invoke_syscall+0x44/0x110
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x20/0x80
el0_svc+0x14/0x4c
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4
el0t_64_sync+0x148/0x14c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mscc: ocelot: Fix use-after-free caused by cyclic delayed work
The origin code calls cancel_delayed_work() in ocelot_stats_deinit()
to cancel the cyclic delayed work item ocelot->stats_work. However,
cancel_delayed_work() may fail to cancel the work item if it is already
executing. While destroy_workqueue() does wait for all pending work items
in the work queue to complete before destroying the work queue, it cannot
prevent the delayed work item from being rescheduled within the
ocelot_check_stats_work() function. This limitation exists because the
delayed work item is only enqueued into the work queue after its timer
expires. Before the timer expiration, destroy_workqueue() has no visibility
of this pending work item. Once the work queue appears empty,
destroy_workqueue() proceeds with destruction. When the timer eventually
expires, the delayed work item gets queued again, leading to the following
warning:
workqueue: cannot queue ocelot_check_stats_work on wq ocelot-switch-stats
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at kernel/workqueue.c:2255 __queue_work+0x875/0xaf0
...
RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x875/0xaf0
...
RSP: 0018:ffff88806d108b10 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000101 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88806d123e88
RBP: ffffffff813c3170 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed100da247d2
R10: ffffed100da247d1 R11: ffff88806d123e8b R12: ffff88800c00f000
R13: ffff88800d7285c0 R14: ffff88806d0a5580 R15: ffff88800d7285a0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880e5725000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe18e45ea10 CR3: 0000000005e6c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? kasan_report+0xc6/0xf0
? __pfx_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
call_timer_fn+0x25/0x1c0
__run_timer_base.part.0+0x3be/0x8c0
? __pfx_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
? rcu_sched_clock_irq+0xb06/0x27d0
? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10
? try_to_wake_up+0xb15/0x1960
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x603/0x7e0
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
? sched_balance_trigger+0x1c0/0x9f0
? sched_tick+0x221/0x5a0
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
? tick_nohz_handler+0x339/0x440
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
__walk_groups.isra.0+0x42/0x150
tmigr_handle_remote+0x1f4/0x2e0
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x60/0x140
? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20
? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0
? hrtimer_interrupt+0x322/0x780
handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550
irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
</IRQ>
...
The following diagram reveals the cause of the above warning:
CPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)
mscc_ocelot_remove() |
ocelot_deinit() | ocelot_check_stats_work()
ocelot_stats_deinit() |
cancel_delayed_work()| ...
| queue_delayed_work()
destroy_workqueue() | (wait a time)
| __queue_work() //UAF
The above scenario actually constitutes a UAF vulnerability.
The ocelot_stats_deinit() is only invoked when initialization
failure or resource destruction, so we must ensure that any
delayed work items cannot be rescheduled.
Replace cancel_delayed_work() with disable_delayed_work_sync()
to guarantee proper cancellation of the delayed work item and
ensure completion of any currently executing work before the
workqueue is deallocated.
A deadlock concern was considered: ocelot_stats_deinit() is called
in a process context and is not holding any locks that the delayed
work item might also need. Therefore, the use of the _sync() variant
is safe here.
This bug was identified through static analysis. To reproduce the
issue and validate the fix, I simulated ocelot-swit
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the USB 9pfs transport layer
where inconsistent size validation between packet header parsing and
actual data copying allows a malicious USB host to overflow heap buffers.
The issue occurs because:
- usb9pfs_rx_header() validates only the declared size in packet header
- usb9pfs_rx_complete() uses req->actual (actual received bytes) for
memcpy
This allows an attacker to craft packets with small declared size
(bypassing validation) but large actual payload (triggering overflow
in memcpy).
Add validation in usb9pfs_rx_complete() to ensure req->actual does not
exceed the buffer capacity before copying data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Check the helper function is valid in get_helper_proto
kernel test robot reported verifier bug [1] where the helper func
pointer could be NULL due to disabled config option.
As Alexei suggested we could check on that in get_helper_proto
directly. Marking tail_call helper func with BPF_PTR_POISON,
because it is unused by design.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202507160818.68358831-lkp@intel.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: usbtmc: Fix direction for 0-length ioctl control messages
The syzbot fuzzer found a problem in the usbtmc driver: When a user
submits an ioctl for a 0-length control transfer, the driver does not
check that the direction is set to OUT:
------------[ cut here ]------------
usb 3-1: BOGUS control dir, pipe 80000b80 doesn't match bRequestType fd
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5100 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:411 usb_submit_urb+0x14a7/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:411
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 5100 Comm: syz-executor428 Not tainted 6.3.0-syzkaller-12049-g58390c8ce1bd #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/14/2023
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0x14a7/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:411
Code: 7c 24 40 e8 1b 13 5c fb 48 8b 7c 24 40 e8 21 1d f0 fe 45 89 e8 44 89 f1 4c 89 e2 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 e0 b5 fc 8a e8 19 c8 23 fb <0f> 0b e9 9f ee ff ff e8 ed 12 5c fb 0f b6 1d 12 8a 3c 08 31 ff 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003d2fb00 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880789e9058 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888029593b80 RSI: ffffffff814c1447 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88801ea742f8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88802915e528
R13: 00000000000000fd R14: 0000000080000b80 R15: ffff8880222b3100
FS: 0000555556ca63c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f9ef4d18150 CR3: 0000000073e5b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
usb_start_wait_urb+0x101/0x4b0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:58
usb_internal_control_msg drivers/usb/core/message.c:102 [inline]
usb_control_msg+0x320/0x4a0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:153
usbtmc_ioctl_request drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c:1954 [inline]
usbtmc_ioctl+0x1b3d/0x2840 drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c:2097
To fix this, we must override the direction in the bRequestType field
of the control request structure when the length is 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/jfs: prevent double-free in dbUnmount() after failed jfs_remount()
Syzkaller reported the following issue:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: double-free in slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: double-free in __kmem_cache_free+0x71/0x110 mm/slub.c:3800
Free of addr ffff888086408000 by task syz-executor.4/12750
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
[...]
kasan_report_invalid_free+0xac/0xd0 mm/kasan/report.c:482
____kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x120
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x12e/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:1807
slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
__kmem_cache_free+0x71/0x110 mm/slub.c:3800
dbUnmount+0xf4/0x110 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:264
jfs_umount+0x248/0x3b0 fs/jfs/jfs_umount.c:87
jfs_put_super+0x86/0x190 fs/jfs/super.c:194
generic_shutdown_super+0x130/0x310 fs/super.c:492
kill_block_super+0x79/0xd0 fs/super.c:1386
deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:332
cleanup_mnt+0x494/0x520 fs/namespace.c:1291
task_work_run+0x243/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:179
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x124/0x150 kernel/entry/common.c:171
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xb2/0x140 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x49/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[...]
</TASK>
Allocated by task 13352:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:52
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x97/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:580 [inline]
dbMount+0x54/0x980 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:164
jfs_mount+0x1dd/0x830 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:121
jfs_fill_super+0x590/0xc50 fs/jfs/super.c:556
mount_bdev+0x26c/0x3a0 fs/super.c:1359
legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:610
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489
do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Freed by task 13352:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:518
____kasan_slab_free+0xd6/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:236
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x12e/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:1807
slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
__kmem_cache_free+0x71/0x110 mm/slub.c:3800
dbUnmount+0xf4/0x110 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:264
jfs_mount_rw+0x545/0x740 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:247
jfs_remount+0x3db/0x710 fs/jfs/super.c:454
reconfigure_super+0x3bc/0x7b0 fs/super.c:935
vfs_fsconfig_locked fs/fsopen.c:254 [inline]
__do_sys_fsconfig fs/fsopen.c:439 [inline]
__se_sys_fsconfig+0xad5/0x1060 fs/fsopen.c:314
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[...]
JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->bmap wasn't set to NULL after kfree() in
dbUnmount().
Syzkaller uses faultinject to reproduce this KASAN double-free
warning. The issue is triggered if either diMount() or dbMount() fail
in jfs_remount(), since diUnmount() or dbUnmount() already happened in
such a case - they will do double-free on next execution: jfs_umount
or jfs_remount.
Tested on both upstream and jfs-next by syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to check readonly condition correctly
With below case, it can mount multi-device image w/ rw option, however
one of secondary device is set as ro, later update will cause panic, so
let's introduce f2fs_dev_is_readonly(), and check multi-devices rw status
in f2fs_remount() w/ it in order to avoid such inconsistent mount status.
mkfs.f2fs -c /dev/zram1 /dev/zram0 -f
blockdev --setro /dev/zram1
mount -t f2fs dev/zram0 /mnt/f2fs
mount: /mnt/f2fs: WARNING: source write-protected, mounted read-only.
mount -t f2fs -o remount,rw mnt/f2fs
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=1M count=8192
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inline.c:258!
RIP: 0010:f2fs_write_inline_data+0x23e/0x2d0 [f2fs]
Call Trace:
f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x26b/0x9f0 [f2fs]
f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x389/0xa60 [f2fs]
__f2fs_write_data_pages+0x26b/0x2d0 [f2fs]
f2fs_write_data_pages+0x2e/0x40 [f2fs]
do_writepages+0xd3/0x1b0
__writeback_single_inode+0x5b/0x420
writeback_sb_inodes+0x236/0x5a0
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x56/0xf0
wb_writeback+0x2a3/0x490
wb_do_writeback+0x2b2/0x330
wb_workfn+0x6a/0x260
process_one_work+0x270/0x5e0
worker_thread+0x52/0x3e0
kthread+0xf4/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
FS: JFS: Check for read-only mounted filesystem in txBegin
This patch adds a check for read-only mounted filesystem
in txBegin before starting a transaction potentially saving
from NULL pointer deref. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: drop peer group ids under namespace lock
When cleaning up peer group ids in the failure path we need to make sure
to hold on to the namespace lock. Otherwise another thread might just
turn the mount from a shared into a non-shared mount concurrently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: b2c2: Fix use-after-free causing by irq_check_work in flexcop_pci_remove
The original code uses cancel_delayed_work() in flexcop_pci_remove(), which
does not guarantee that the delayed work item irq_check_work has fully
completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios
where flexcop_pci_remove() may free the flexcop_device while irq_check_work
is still active and attempts to dereference the device.
A typical race condition is illustrated below:
CPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)
flexcop_pci_remove() | flexcop_pci_irq_check_work()
cancel_delayed_work() |
flexcop_device_kfree(fc_pci->fc_dev) |
| fc = fc_pci->fc_dev; // UAF
This is confirmed by a KASAN report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880093aa8c8 by task bash/135
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_report+0xcf/0x610
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
__run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x60/0x140
? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20
? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0
run_timer_softirq+0xd1/0x190
handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550
irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
</IRQ>
...
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
__kmalloc_noprof+0x1be/0x460
flexcop_device_kmalloc+0x54/0xe0
flexcop_pci_probe+0x1f/0x9d0
local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x190
pci_device_probe+0x2fe/0x470
really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120
__driver_attach+0xd2/0x310
bus_for_each_dev+0xed/0x170
bus_add_driver+0x208/0x500
driver_register+0x132/0x460
do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300
kernel_init_freeable+0x40d/0x720
kernel_init+0x1a/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x10c/0x1a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 135:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50
kfree+0x137/0x370
flexcop_device_kfree+0x32/0x50
pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0
device_release_driver_internal+0xf8/0x210
pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x15/0x30
remove_store+0xcc/0xe0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c3/0x440
vfs_write+0x871/0xd70
ksys_write+0xee/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure
that the delayed work item is properly canceled and any executing delayed
work has finished before the device memory is deallocated.
This bug was initially identified through static analysis. To reproduce
and test it, I simulated the B2C2 FlexCop PCI device in QEMU and introduced
artificial delays within the flexcop_pci_irq_check_work() function to
increase the likelihood of triggering the bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virt/coco/sev-guest: Double-buffer messages
The encryption algorithms read and write directly to shared unencrypted
memory, which may leak information as well as permit the host to tamper
with the message integrity. Instead, copy whole messages in or out as
needed before doing any computation on them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: firewire-motu: fix buffer overflow in hwdep read for DSP events
The DSP event handling code in hwdep_read() could write more bytes to
the user buffer than requested, when a user provides a buffer smaller
than the event header size (8 bytes).
Fix by using min_t() to clamp the copy size, This ensures we never copy
more than the user requested. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: i2c: tc358743: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by orphan timer in probe
The state->timer is a cyclic timer that schedules work_i2c_poll and
delayed_work_enable_hotplug, while rearming itself. Using timer_delete()
fails to guarantee the timer isn't still running when destroyed, similarly
cancel_delayed_work() cannot ensure delayed_work_enable_hotplug has
terminated if already executing. During probe failure after timer
initialization, these may continue running as orphans and reference the
already-freed tc358743_state object through tc358743_irq_poll_timer.
The following is the trace captured by KASAN.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800ded83c8 by task swapper/1/0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_report+0xcf/0x610
? __pfx_sched_balance_find_src_group+0x10/0x10
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
__run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
? rcu_sched_clock_irq+0xb06/0x27d0
? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10
? try_to_wake_up+0xb15/0x1960
? tmigr_update_events+0x280/0x740
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x603/0x7e0
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
? sched_balance_trigger+0x98/0x9f0
? sched_tick+0x221/0x5a0
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
? tick_nohz_handler+0x339/0x440
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
__walk_groups.isra.0+0x42/0x150
tmigr_handle_remote+0x1f4/0x2e0
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x60/0x140
? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20
? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0
? hrtimer_interrupt+0x322/0x780
handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550
irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
</IRQ>
...
Allocated by task 141:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x198/0x430
devm_kmalloc+0x7b/0x1e0
tc358743_probe+0xb7/0x610 i2c_device_probe+0x51d/0x880
really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x174/0x220
bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x190
__device_attach+0x206/0x370
bus_probe_device+0x123/0x170
device_add+0xd25/0x1470
i2c_new_client_device+0x7a0/0xcd0
do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300
do_init_module+0x29d/0x7f0
load_module+0x4f48/0x69e0
init_module_from_file+0xe4/0x150
idempotent_init_module+0x320/0x670
__x64_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120
do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 141:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50
kfree+0x137/0x370
release_nodes+0xa4/0x100
devres_release_group+0x1b2/0x380
i2c_device_probe+0x694/0x880
really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x174/0x220
bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x190
__device_attach+0x206/0x370
bus_probe_device+0x123/0x170
device_add+0xd25/0x1470
i2c_new_client_device+0x7a0/0xcd0
do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300
do_init_module+0x29d/0x7f0
load_module+0x4f48/0x69e0
init_module_from_file+0xe4/0x150
idempotent_init_module+0x320/0x670
__x64_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120
do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
Replace timer_delete() with timer_delete_sync() and cancel_delayed_work()
with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure proper termination of timer and
work items before resource cleanup.
This bug was initially identified through static analysis. For reproduction
and testing, I created a functional emulation of the tc358743 device via a
kernel module and introduced faults through the debugfs interface. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfs/hfsplus: avoid WARN_ON() for sanity check, use proper error handling
Commit 55d1cbbbb29e ("hfs/hfsplus: use WARN_ON for sanity check") fixed
a build warning by turning a comment into a WARN_ON(), but it turns out
that syzbot then complains because it can trigger said warning with a
corrupted hfs image.
The warning actually does warn about a bad situation, but we are much
better off just handling it as the error it is. So rather than warn
about us doing bad things, stop doing the bad things and return -EIO.
While at it, also fix a memory leak that was introduced by an earlier
fix for a similar syzbot warning situation, and add a check for one case
that historically wasn't handled at all (ie neither comment nor
subsequent WARN_ON). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: remove BUG_ON()'s in add_new_free_space()
At add_new_free_space() we have these BUG_ON()'s that are there to deal
with any failure to add free space to the in memory free space cache.
Such failures are mostly -ENOMEM that should be very rare. However there's
no need to have these BUG_ON()'s, we can just return any error to the
caller and all callers and their upper call chain are already dealing with
errors.
So just make add_new_free_space() return any errors, while removing the
BUG_ON()'s, and returning the total amount of added free space to an
optional u64 pointer argument. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Fix NULL pointer dereference in cs35l41_hda_read_acpi()
The acpi_get_first_physical_node() function can return NULL, in which
case the get_device() function also returns NULL, but this value is
then dereferenced without checking,so add a check to prevent a crash.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: c6xdigio: Fix invalid PNP driver unregistration
The Comedi low-level driver "c6xdigio" seems to be for a parallel port
connected device. When the Comedi core calls the driver's Comedi
"attach" handler `c6xdigio_attach()` to configure a Comedi to use this
driver, it tries to enable the parallel port PNP resources by
registering a PNP driver with `pnp_register_driver()`, but ignores the
return value. (The `struct pnp_driver` it uses has only the `name` and
`id_table` members filled in.) The driver's Comedi "detach" handler
`c6xdigio_detach()` unconditionally unregisters the PNP driver with
`pnp_unregister_driver()`.
It is possible for `c6xdigio_attach()` to return an error before it
calls `pnp_register_driver()` and it is possible for the call to
`pnp_register_driver()` to return an error (that is ignored). In both
cases, the driver should not be calling `pnp_unregister_driver()` as it
does in `c6xdigio_detach()`. (Note that `c6xdigio_detach()` will be
called by the Comedi core if `c6xdigio_attach()` returns an error, or if
the Comedi core decides to detach the Comedi device from the driver for
some other reason.)
The unconditional call to `pnp_unregister_driver()` without a previous
successful call to `pnp_register_driver()` will cause
`driver_unregister()` to issue a warning "Unexpected driver
unregister!". This was detected by Syzbot [1].
Also, the PNP driver registration and unregistration should be done at
module init and exit time, respectively, not when attaching or detaching
Comedi devices to the driver. (There might be more than one Comedi
device being attached to the driver, although that is unlikely.)
Change the driver to do the PNP driver registration at module init time,
and the unregistration at module exit time. Since `c6xdigio_detach()`
now only calls `comedi_legacy_detach()`, remove the function and change
the Comedi driver "detach" handler to `comedi_legacy_detach`.
-------------------------------------------
[1] Syzbot sample crash report:
Unexpected driver unregister!
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5970 at drivers/base/driver.c:273 driver_unregister drivers/base/driver.c:273 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5970 at drivers/base/driver.c:273 driver_unregister+0x90/0xb0 drivers/base/driver.c:270
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5970 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/02/2025
RIP: 0010:driver_unregister drivers/base/driver.c:273 [inline]
RIP: 0010:driver_unregister+0x90/0xb0 drivers/base/driver.c:270
Code: 48 89 ef e8 c2 e6 82 fc 48 89 df e8 3a 93 ff ff 5b 5d e9 c3 6d d9 fb e8 be 6d d9 fb 90 48 c7 c7 e0 f8 1f 8c e8 51 a2 97 fb 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 5b 5d e9 a5 6d d9 fb e8 e0 f4 41 fc eb 94 e8 d9 f4 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000373f9a0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8ff24720 RCX: ffffffff817b6ee8
RDX: ffff88807c932480 RSI: ffffffff817b6ef5 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8ff24660
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88814cca0000
FS: 000055556dab1500(0000) GS:ffff8881249d9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f77f285cd0 CR3: 000000007d871000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
comedi_device_detach_locked+0x12f/0xa50 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:207
comedi_device_detach+0x67/0xb0 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:215
comedi_device_attach+0x43d/0x900 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:1011
do_devconfig_ioctl+0x1b1/0x710 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:872
comedi_unlocked_ioctl+0x165d/0x2f00 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:2178
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_sys
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: rng - Ensure set_ent is always present
Ensure that set_ent is always set since only drbg provides it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: check device's attached status in compat ioctls
Syzbot identified an issue [1] that crashes kernel, seemingly due to
unexistent callback dev->get_valid_routes(). By all means, this should
not occur as said callback must always be set to
get_zero_valid_routes() in __comedi_device_postconfig().
As the crash seems to appear exclusively in i386 kernels, at least,
judging from [1] reports, the blame lies with compat versions
of standard IOCTL handlers. Several of them are modified and
do not use comedi_unlocked_ioctl(). While functionality of these
ioctls essentially copy their original versions, they do not
have required sanity check for device's attached status. This,
in turn, leads to a possibility of calling select IOCTLs on a
device that has not been properly setup, even via COMEDI_DEVCONFIG.
Doing so on unconfigured devices means that several crucial steps
are missed, for instance, specifying dev->get_valid_routes()
callback.
Fix this somewhat crudely by ensuring device's attached status before
performing any ioctls, improving logic consistency between modern
and compat functions.
[1] Syzbot report:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000006c717000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
get_valid_routes drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1322 [inline]
parse_insn+0x78c/0x1970 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1401
do_insnlist_ioctl+0x272/0x700 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1594
compat_insnlist drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:3208 [inline]
comedi_compat_ioctl+0x810/0x990 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:3273
__do_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:695 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:638 [inline]
__ia32_compat_sys_ioctl+0x242/0x370 fs/ioctl.c:638
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:83 [inline]
... |
