| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: bfa: Double-free fix
When the bfad_im_probe() function fails during initialization, the memory
pointed to by bfad->im is freed without setting bfad->im to NULL.
Subsequently, during driver uninstallation, when the state machine enters
the bfad_sm_stopping state and calls the bfad_im_probe_undo() function,
it attempts to free the memory pointed to by bfad->im again, thereby
triggering a double-free vulnerability.
Set bfad->im to NULL if probing fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: upper bound check of tree index in dbAllocAG
When computing the tree index in dbAllocAG, we never check if we are
out of bounds realative to the size of the stree.
This could happen in a scenario where the filesystem metadata are
corrupted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: Fix vmalloc out-of-bounds write in fast_imageblit
This issue triggers when a userspace program does an ioctl
FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP by passing console number and frame buffer number.
Ideally this maps console to frame buffer and updates the screen if
console is visible.
As part of mapping it has to do resize of console according to frame
buffer info. if this resize fails and returns from vc_do_resize() and
continues further. At this point console and new frame buffer are mapped
and sets display vars. Despite failure still it continue to proceed
updating the screen at later stages where vc_data is related to previous
frame buffer and frame buffer info and display vars are mapped to new
frame buffer and eventully leading to out-of-bounds write in
fast_imageblit(). This bheviour is excepted only when fg_console is
equal to requested console which is a visible console and updates screen
with invalid struct references in fbcon_putcs(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: uvcvideo: Fix 1-byte out-of-bounds read in uvc_parse_format()
The buffer length check before calling uvc_parse_format() only ensured
that the buffer has at least 3 bytes (buflen > 2), buf the function
accesses buffer[3], requiring at least 4 bytes.
This can lead to an out-of-bounds read if the buffer has exactly 3 bytes.
Fix it by checking that the buffer has at least 4 bytes in
uvc_parse_format(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: venus: Fix OOB read due to missing payload bound check
Currently, The event_seq_changed() handler processes a variable number
of properties sent by the firmware. The number of properties is indicated
by the firmware and used to iterate over the payload. However, the
payload size is not being validated against the actual message length.
This can lead to out-of-bounds memory access if the firmware provides a
property count that exceeds the data available in the payload. Such a
condition can result in kernel crashes or potential information leaks if
memory beyond the buffer is accessed.
Fix this by properly validating the remaining size of the payload before
each property access and updating bounds accordingly as properties are
parsed.
This ensures that property parsing is safely bounded within the received
message buffer and protects against malformed or malicious firmware
behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid out-of-boundary access in dnode page
As Jiaming Zhang reported:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1c1/0x2a0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x17e/0x800 mm/kasan/report.c:480
kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:593
data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3053 [inline]
f2fs_data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3058 [inline]
f2fs_get_dnode_of_data+0x1a09/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/node.c:855
f2fs_reserve_block+0x53/0x310 fs/f2fs/data.c:1195
prepare_write_begin fs/f2fs/data.c:3395 [inline]
f2fs_write_begin+0xf39/0x2190 fs/f2fs/data.c:3594
generic_perform_write+0x2c7/0x910 mm/filemap.c:4112
f2fs_buffered_write_iter fs/f2fs/file.c:4988 [inline]
f2fs_file_write_iter+0x1ec8/0x2410 fs/f2fs/file.c:5216
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x546/0xa90 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0x149/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The root cause is in the corrupted image, there is a dnode has the same
node id w/ its inode, so during f2fs_get_dnode_of_data(), it tries to
access block address in dnode at offset 934, however it parses the dnode
as inode node, so that get_dnode_addr() returns 360, then it tries to
access page address from 360 + 934 * 4 = 4096 w/ 4 bytes.
To fix this issue, let's add sanity check for node id of all direct nodes
during f2fs_get_dnode_of_data(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Avoid stack buffer overflow from kernel cmdline
While the kernel command line is considered trusted in most environments,
avoid writing 1 byte past the end of "acpiid" if the "str" argument is
maximum length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(), call_on_irq_stack()
`cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change
to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled.
Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions
can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely,
is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks
and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks.
In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task,
but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler
tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task
SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0),
clobbering it.
In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack
to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be
interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to
the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses
on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack,
calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with
the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use !
This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS,
or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
or FPAC if enabled.
This is possible on a default config, but unlikely.
However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and
instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU
should receive based on priority.
Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU
even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very*
frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading
to unpredictable kernel panics.
Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning.
Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around
the branch.
Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency
of behaviour between all configurations.
Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF,
as the existing one saves but only masks IF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: plug races between subflow fail and subflow creation
We have races similar to the one addressed by the previous patch between
subflow failing and additional subflow creation. They are just harder to
trigger.
The solution is similar. Use a separate flag to track the condition
'socket state prevent any additional subflow creation' protected by the
fallback lock.
The socket fallback makes such flag true, and also receiving or sending
an MP_FAIL option.
The field 'allow_infinite_fallback' is now always touched under the
relevant lock, we can drop the ONCE annotation on write. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage
Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage
can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a
cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program
doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of
the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context
the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the
BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program
uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the
runtime context:
ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx);
storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype];
if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED)
ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0];
else
ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf);
For the second program which was called from the originally attached
one, this means bpf_get_local_storage() will pick up the former
program's map, not its own. With mismatching sizes, this can result
in an unintended out-of-bounds access.
To fix this issue, we need to extend bpf_map_owner with an array of
storage_cookie[] to match on i) the exact maps from the original
program if the second program was using bpf_get_local_storage(), or
ii) allow the tail call combination if the second program was not
using any of the cgroup local storage maps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: always refresh the queue when reading sock
After recent changes in net-next TCP compacts skbs much more
aggressively. This unearthed a bug in TLS where we may try
to operate on an old skb when checking if all skbs in the
queue have matching decrypt state and geometry.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tls_strp_check_rcv+0x898/0x9a0 [tls]
(net/tls/tls_strp.c:436 net/tls/tls_strp.c:530 net/tls/tls_strp.c:544)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888013085750 by task tls/13529
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13529 Comm: tls Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-virtme
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0xca/0x100
tls_strp_check_rcv+0x898/0x9a0 [tls]
tls_rx_rec_wait+0x2c9/0x8d0 [tls]
tls_sw_recvmsg+0x40f/0x1aa0 [tls]
inet_recvmsg+0x1c3/0x1f0
Always reload the queue, fast path is to have the record in the queue
when we wake, anyway (IOW the path going down "if !strp->stm.full_len"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Always pass notifications when child class becomes empty
Certain classful qdiscs may invoke their classes' dequeue handler on an
enqueue operation. This may unexpectedly empty the child qdisc and thus
make an in-flight class passive via qlen_notify(). Most qdiscs do not
expect such behaviour at this point in time and may re-activate the
class eventually anyways which will lead to a use-after-free.
The referenced fix commit attempted to fix this behavior for the HFSC
case by moving the backlog accounting around, though this turned out to
be incomplete since the parent's parent may run into the issue too.
The following reproducer demonstrates this use-after-free:
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: drr
tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 drr
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: hfsc def 1
tc class add dev lo parent 2: classid 2:1 hfsc rt m1 8 d 1 m2 0
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 2:1 handle 3: netem
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 3:1 handle 4: blackhole
echo 1 | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888
tc class delete dev lo classid 1:1
echo 1 | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888
Since backlog accounting issues leading to a use-after-frees on stale
class pointers is a recurring pattern at this point, this patch takes
a different approach. Instead of trying to fix the accounting, the patch
ensures that qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog always calls qlen_notify when
the child qdisc is empty. This solves the problem because deletion of
qdiscs always involves a call to qdisc_reset() and / or
qdisc_purge_queue() which ultimately resets its qlen to 0 thus causing
the following qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() to report to the parent. Note
that this may call qlen_notify on passive classes multiple times. This
is not a problem after the recent patch series that made all the
classful qdiscs qlen_notify() handlers idempotent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
software node: Correct a OOB check in software_node_get_reference_args()
software_node_get_reference_args() wants to get @index-th element, so
the property value requires at least '(index + 1) * sizeof(*ref)' bytes
but that can not be guaranteed by current OOB check, and may cause OOB
for malformed property.
Fix by using as OOB check '((index + 1) * sizeof(*ref) > prop->length)'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Avoid __bpf_prog_ret0_warn when jit fails
syzkaller reported an issue:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 217 at kernel/bpf/core.c:2357 __bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u32:6 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4-syzkaller-00040-g8bac8898fe39
RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
cls_bpf_classify+0x74a/0x1110 net/sched/cls_bpf.c:105
...
When creating bpf program, 'fp->jit_requested' depends on bpf_jit_enable.
This issue is triggered because of CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is not set
and bpf_jit_enable is set to 1, causing the arch to attempt JIT the prog,
but jit failed due to FAULT_INJECTION. As a result, incorrectly
treats the program as valid, when the program runs it calls
`__bpf_prog_ret0_warn` and triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE(1). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Don't leave consecutive consumed OOB skbs.
Jann Horn reported a use-after-free in unix_stream_read_generic().
The following sequences reproduce the issue:
$ python3
from socket import *
s1, s2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM)
s1.send(b'x', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb
s1.send(b'y', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb
s1.send(b'z', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1) # recv 'z' illegally
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # access 'z' skb (use-after-free)
Even though a user reads OOB data, the skb holding the data stays on
the recv queue to mark the OOB boundary and break the next recv().
After the last send() in the scenario above, the sk2's recv queue has
2 leading consumed OOB skbs and 1 real OOB skb.
Then, the following happens during the next recv() without MSG_OOB
1. unix_stream_read_generic() peeks the first consumed OOB skb
2. manage_oob() returns the next consumed OOB skb
3. unix_stream_read_generic() fetches the next not-yet-consumed OOB skb
4. unix_stream_read_generic() reads and frees the OOB skb
, and the last recv(MSG_OOB) triggers KASAN splat.
The 3. above occurs because of the SO_PEEK_OFF code, which does not
expect unix_skb_len(skb) to be 0, but this is true for such consumed
OOB skbs.
while (skip >= unix_skb_len(skb)) {
skip -= unix_skb_len(skb);
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
...
}
In addition to this use-after-free, there is another issue that
ioctl(SIOCATMARK) does not function properly with consecutive consumed
OOB skbs.
So, nothing good comes out of such a situation.
Instead of complicating manage_oob(), ioctl() handling, and the next
ECONNRESET fix by introducing a loop for consecutive consumed OOB skbs,
let's not leave such consecutive OOB unnecessarily.
Now, while receiving an OOB skb in unix_stream_recv_urg(), if its
previous skb is a consumed OOB skb, it is freed.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106ef2904 by task python3/315
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 315 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-00407-gec315832f6f9 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:409 mm/kasan/report.c:521)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:636)
unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027)
unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:2708 net/unix/af_unix.c:2847)
unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048)
sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20))
__sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278)
__x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f8911fcea06
Code: 5d e8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 19 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 11 e8 26 ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 8b 5d f8 c9 c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007fffdb0dccb0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffdb0dcdc8 RCX: 00007f8911fcea06
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f8911a5e060 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fffdb0dccd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f89119a7d20
R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 315:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1))
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:348)
kmem_cache_alloc_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipc: fix to protect IPCS lookups using RCU
syzbot reported that it discovered a use-after-free vulnerability, [0]
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67af13f8.050a0220.21dd3.0038.GAE@google.com/
idr_for_each() is protected by rwsem, but this is not enough. If it is
not protected by RCU read-critical region, when idr_for_each() calls
radix_tree_node_free() through call_rcu() to free the radix_tree_node
structure, the node will be freed immediately, and when reading the next
node in radix_tree_for_each_slot(), the already freed memory may be read.
Therefore, we need to add code to make sure that idr_for_each() is
protected within the RCU read-critical region when we call it in
shm_destroy_orphaned(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbcon: Make sure modelist not set on unregistered console
It looks like attempting to write to the "store_modes" sysfs node will
run afoul of unregistered consoles:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:122:28
index -1 is out of range for type 'fb_info *[32]'
...
fbcon_info_from_console+0x192/0x1a0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:122
fbcon_new_modelist+0xbf/0x2d0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:3048
fb_new_modelist+0x328/0x440 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:673
store_modes+0x1c9/0x3e0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c:113
dev_attr_store+0x55/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2439
static struct fb_info *fbcon_registered_fb[FB_MAX];
...
static signed char con2fb_map[MAX_NR_CONSOLES];
...
static struct fb_info *fbcon_info_from_console(int console)
...
return fbcon_registered_fb[con2fb_map[console]];
If con2fb_map contains a -1 things go wrong here. Instead, return NULL,
as callers of fbcon_info_from_console() are trying to compare against
existing "info" pointers, so error handling should kick in correctly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mdiobus: Fix potential out-of-bounds read/write access
When using publicly available tools like 'mdio-tools' to read/write data
from/to network interface and its PHY via mdiobus, there is no verification of
parameters passed to the ioctl and it accepts any mdio address.
Currently there is support for 32 addresses in kernel via PHY_MAX_ADDR define,
but it is possible to pass higher value than that via ioctl.
While read/write operation should generally fail in this case,
mdiobus provides stats array, where wrong address may allow out-of-bounds
read/write.
Fix that by adding address verification before read/write operation.
While this excludes this access from any statistics, it improves security of
read/write operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: algif_hash - fix double free in hash_accept
If accept(2) is called on socket type algif_hash with
MSG_MORE flag set and crypto_ahash_import fails,
sk2 is freed. However, it is also freed in af_alg_release,
leading to slab-use-after-free error. |
| XZ Utils provide a general-purpose data-compression library plus command-line tools. In XZ Utils 5.3.3alpha to 5.8.0, the multithreaded .xz decoder in liblzma has a bug where invalid input can at least result in a crash. The effects include heap use after free and writing to an address based on the null pointer plus an offset. Applications and libraries that use the lzma_stream_decoder_mt function are affected. The bug has been fixed in XZ Utils 5.8.1, and the fix has been committed to the v5.4, v5.6, v5.8, and master branches in the xz Git repository. No new release packages will be made from the old stable branches, but a standalone patch is available that applies to all affected releases. |
