| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block, bfq: fix bfqq uaf in bfq_limit_depth()
Set new allocated bfqq to bic or remove freed bfqq from bic are both
protected by bfqd->lock, however bfq_limit_depth() is deferencing bfqq
from bic without the lock, this can lead to UAF if the io_context is
shared by multiple tasks.
For example, test bfq with io_uring can trigger following UAF in v6.6:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfqq_group+0x15/0x50
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x80
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x66/0x300
print_report+0x3e/0x70
kasan_report+0xb4/0xf0
bfqq_group+0x15/0x50
bfqq_request_over_limit+0x130/0x9a0
bfq_limit_depth+0x1b5/0x480
__blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x2b5/0xa00
blk_mq_get_new_requests+0x11d/0x1d0
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x286/0xb00
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x331/0x400
__block_write_full_folio+0x3d0/0x640
writepage_cb+0x3b/0xc0
write_cache_pages+0x254/0x6c0
write_cache_pages+0x254/0x6c0
do_writepages+0x192/0x310
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x95/0xc0
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x99/0xd0
filemap_write_and_wait_range.part.0+0x4d/0xa0
blkdev_read_iter+0xef/0x1e0
io_read+0x1b6/0x8a0
io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300
io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390
io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550
io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 808602:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x83/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b1/0x6d0
bfq_get_queue+0x138/0xfa0
bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0xe3/0x2c0
bfq_init_rq+0x196/0xbb0
bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0xb5/0x480
bfq_insert_requests+0x156/0x180
blk_mq_insert_request+0x15d/0x440
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a4/0xb00
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x331/0x400
__blkdev_direct_IO_async+0x2dd/0x330
blkdev_write_iter+0x39a/0x450
io_write+0x22a/0x840
io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300
io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390
io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550
io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
Freed by task 808589:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40
__kasan_slab_free+0x126/0x1b0
kmem_cache_free+0x10c/0x750
bfq_put_queue+0x2dd/0x770
__bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0x155/0x7a0
bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0x122/0x480
bfq_insert_requests+0x156/0x180
blk_mq_dispatch_plug_list+0x528/0x7e0
blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.0+0xe5/0x590
__blk_flush_plug+0x3b/0x90
blk_finish_plug+0x40/0x60
do_writepages+0x19d/0x310
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x95/0xc0
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x99/0xd0
filemap_write_and_wait_range.part.0+0x4d/0xa0
blkdev_read_iter+0xef/0x1e0
io_read+0x1b6/0x8a0
io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300
io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390
io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550
io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
Fix the problem by protecting bic_to_bfqq() with bfqd->lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: stop qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog on TC_H_ROOT
In qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog, Qdiscs with major handle ffff: are assumed
to be either root or ingress. This assumption is bogus since it's valid
to create egress qdiscs with major handle ffff:
Budimir Markovic found that for qdiscs like DRR that maintain an active
class list, it will cause a UAF with a dangling class pointer.
In 066a3b5b2346, the concern was to avoid iterating over the ingress
qdisc since its parent is itself. The proper fix is to stop when parent
TC_H_ROOT is reached because the only way to retrieve ingress is when a
hierarchy which does not contain a ffff: major handle call into
qdisc_lookup with TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_ROOT).
In the scenario where major ffff: is an egress qdisc in any of the tree
levels, the updates will also propagate to TC_H_ROOT, which then the
iteration must stop.
net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: altmode should keep reference to parent
The altmode device release refers to its parent device, but without keeping
a reference to it.
When registering the altmode, get a reference to the parent and put it in
the release function.
Before this fix, when using CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE, we see issues
like this:
[ 43.572860] kobject: 'port0.0' (ffff8880057ba008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 3000)
[ 43.573532] kobject: 'port0.1' (ffff8880057bd008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
[ 43.574407] kobject: 'port0' (ffff8880057b9008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 3000)
[ 43.575059] kobject: 'port1.0' (ffff8880057ca008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 4000)
[ 43.575908] kobject: 'port1.1' (ffff8880057c9008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 4000)
[ 43.576908] kobject: 'typec' (ffff8880062dbc00): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 4000)
[ 43.577769] kobject: 'port1' (ffff8880057bf008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 3000)
[ 46.612867] ==================================================================
[ 46.613402] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129
[ 46.614003] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880057b9118 by task kworker/2:1/48
[ 46.614538]
[ 46.614668] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 48 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00138-gedbae730ad31 #535
[ 46.615391] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 46.616042] Workqueue: events kobject_delayed_cleanup
[ 46.616446] Call Trace:
[ 46.616648] <TASK>
[ 46.616820] dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x7c
[ 46.617112] ? typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129
[ 46.617470] print_report+0x14c/0x49e
[ 46.617769] ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0x56/0x69
[ 46.618117] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x19a/0x1ab
[ 46.618456] ? kmem_cache_debug_flags+0xc/0x1d
[ 46.618807] ? typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129
[ 46.619161] kasan_report+0x8d/0xb4
[ 46.619447] ? typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129
[ 46.619809] ? process_scheduled_works+0x3cb/0x85f
[ 46.620185] typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129
[ 46.620537] ? process_scheduled_works+0x3cb/0x85f
[ 46.620907] device_release+0xaf/0xf2
[ 46.621206] kobject_delayed_cleanup+0x13b/0x17a
[ 46.621584] process_scheduled_works+0x4f6/0x85f
[ 46.621955] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[ 46.622353] ? hlock_class+0x31/0x9a
[ 46.622647] ? lock_acquired+0x361/0x3c3
[ 46.622956] ? move_linked_works+0x46/0x7d
[ 46.623277] worker_thread+0x1ce/0x291
[ 46.623582] ? __kthread_parkme+0xc8/0xdf
[ 46.623900] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 46.624236] kthread+0x17e/0x190
[ 46.624501] ? kthread+0xfb/0x190
[ 46.624756] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 46.625015] ret_from_fork+0x20/0x40
[ 46.625268] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 46.625532] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 46.625805] </TASK>
[ 46.625953]
[ 46.626056] Allocated by task 678:
[ 46.626287] kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x44
[ 46.626555] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x2d
[ 46.626811] __kasan_kmalloc+0x3f/0x4d
[ 46.627049] __kmalloc_noprof+0x1bf/0x1f0
[ 46.627362] typec_register_port+0x23/0x491
[ 46.627698] cros_typec_probe+0x634/0xbb6
[ 46.628026] platform_probe+0x47/0x8c
[ 46.628311] really_probe+0x20a/0x47d
[ 46.628605] device_driver_attach+0x39/0x72
[ 46.628940] bind_store+0x87/0xd7
[ 46.629213] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1aa/0x218
[ 46.629574] vfs_write+0x1d6/0x29b
[ 46.629856] ksys_write+0xcd/0x13b
[ 46.630128] do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x139
[ 46.630420] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 46.630820]
[ 46.630946] Freed by task 48:
[ 46.631182] kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x44
[ 46.631493] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x2d
[ 46.631799] kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x4d
[ 46.632144] __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x45
[ 46.632474]
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: fix use-after-free in taprio_change()
In 'taprio_change()', 'admin' pointer may become dangling due to sched
switch / removal caused by 'advance_sched()', and critical section
protected by 'q->current_entry_lock' is too small to prevent from such
a scenario (which causes use-after-free detected by KASAN). Fix this
by prefer 'rcu_replace_pointer()' over 'rcu_assign_pointer()' to update
'admin' immediately before an attempt to schedule freeing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: cancel nfsd_shrinker_work using sync mode in nfs4_state_shutdown_net
In the normal case, when we excute `echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads`, the
function `nfs4_state_destroy_net` in `nfs4_state_shutdown_net` will
release all resources related to the hashed `nfs4_client`. If the
`nfsd_client_shrinker` is running concurrently, the `expire_client`
function will first unhash this client and then destroy it. This can
lead to the following warning. Additionally, numerous use-after-free
errors may occur as well.
nfsd_client_shrinker echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads
expire_client nfsd_shutdown_net
unhash_client ...
nfs4_state_shutdown_net
/* won't wait shrinker exit */
/* cancel_work(&nn->nfsd_shrinker_work)
* nfsd_file for this /* won't destroy unhashed client1 */
* client1 still alive nfs4_state_destroy_net
*/
nfsd_file_cache_shutdown
/* trigger warning */
kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_slab)
kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_mark_slab)
/* release nfsd_file and mark */
__destroy_client
====================================================================
BUG nfsd_file (Not tainted): Objects remaining in nfsd_file on
__kmem_cache_shutdown()
--------------------------------------------------------------------
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 764 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
slab_err+0xb0/0xf0
__kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310
kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160
nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xac/0x210 [nfsd]
nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
====================================================================
BUG nfsd_file_mark (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining
nfsd_file_mark on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
--------------------------------------------------------------------
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
slab_err+0xb0/0xf0
__kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310
kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160
nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xc8/0x210 [nfsd]
nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
To resolve this issue, cancel `nfsd_shrinker_work` using synchronous
mode in nfs4_state_shutdown_net. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: Fix uaf in dbFreeBits
[syzbot reported]
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0xfe/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880229254b0 by task syz-executor357/5216
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5216 Comm: syz-executor357 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00156-gd7a5aa4b3c00 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xfe/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
dbFreeBits+0x7ea/0xd90 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2390
dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2089 [inline]
dbFree+0x35b/0x680 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:409
dbDiscardAG+0x8a9/0xa20 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1650
jfs_ioc_trim+0x433/0x670 fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c:100
jfs_ioctl+0x2d0/0x3e0 fs/jfs/ioctl.c:131
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
Freed by task 5218:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline]
kfree+0x149/0x360 mm/slub.c:4594
dbUnmount+0x11d/0x190 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:278
jfs_mount_rw+0x4ac/0x6a0 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:247
jfs_remount+0x3d1/0x6b0 fs/jfs/super.c:454
reconfigure_super+0x445/0x880 fs/super.c:1083
vfs_cmd_reconfigure fs/fsopen.c:263 [inline]
vfs_fsconfig_locked fs/fsopen.c:292 [inline]
__do_sys_fsconfig fs/fsopen.c:473 [inline]
__se_sys_fsconfig+0xb6e/0xf80 fs/fsopen.c:345
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[Analysis]
There are two paths (dbUnmount and jfs_ioc_trim) that generate race
condition when accessing bmap, which leads to the occurrence of uaf.
Use the lock s_umount to synchronize them, in order to avoid uaf caused
by race condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: avoid use-after-free in ext4_ext_show_leaf()
In ext4_find_extent(), path may be freed by error or be reallocated, so
using a previously saved *ppath may have been freed and thus may trigger
use-after-free, as follows:
ext4_split_extent
path = *ppath;
ext4_split_extent_at(ppath)
path = ext4_find_extent(ppath)
ext4_split_extent_at(ppath)
// ext4_find_extent fails to free path
// but zeroout succeeds
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path)
eh = path[depth].p_hdr
// path use-after-free !!!
Similar to ext4_split_extent_at(), we use *ppath directly as an input to
ext4_ext_show_leaf(). Fix a spelling error by the way.
Same problem in ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(). Since 'path' is only
used in ext4_ext_show_leaf(), remove 'path' and use *ppath directly.
This issue is triggered only when EXT_DEBUG is defined and therefore does
not affect functionality. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: seeq: Fix use after free vulnerability in ether3 Driver Due to Race Condition
In the ether3_probe function, a timer is initialized with a callback
function ether3_ledoff, bound to &prev(dev)->timer. Once the timer is
started, there is a risk of a race condition if the module or device
is removed, triggering the ether3_remove function to perform cleanup.
The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows:
CPU0 CPU1
| ether3_ledoff
ether3_remove |
free_netdev(dev); |
put_devic |
kfree(dev); |
| ether3_outw(priv(dev)->regs.config2 |= CFG2_CTRLO, REG_CONFIG2);
| // use dev
Fix it by ensuring that the timer is canceled before proceeding with
the cleanup in ether3_remove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: always wait for both firmware loading attempts
In 'rtw_wait_firmware_completion()', always wait for both (regular and
wowlan) firmware loading attempts. Otherwise if 'rtw_usb_intf_init()'
has failed in 'rtw_usb_probe()', 'rtw_usb_disconnect()' may issue
'ieee80211_free_hw()' when one of 'rtw_load_firmware_cb()' (usually
the wowlan one) is still in progress, causing UAF detected by KASAN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block, bfq: fix possible UAF for bfqq->bic with merge chain
1) initial state, three tasks:
Process 1 Process 2 Process 3
(BIC1) (BIC2) (BIC3)
| Λ | Λ | Λ
| | | | | |
V | V | V |
bfqq1 bfqq2 bfqq3
process ref: 1 1 1
2) bfqq1 merged to bfqq2:
Process 1 Process 2 Process 3
(BIC1) (BIC2) (BIC3)
| | | Λ
\--------------\| | |
V V |
bfqq1--------->bfqq2 bfqq3
process ref: 0 2 1
3) bfqq2 merged to bfqq3:
Process 1 Process 2 Process 3
(BIC1) (BIC2) (BIC3)
here -> Λ | |
\--------------\ \-------------\|
V V
bfqq1--------->bfqq2---------->bfqq3
process ref: 0 1 3
In this case, IO from Process 1 will get bfqq2 from BIC1 first, and then
get bfqq3 through merge chain, and finially handle IO by bfqq3.
Howerver, current code will think bfqq2 is owned by BIC1, like initial
state, and set bfqq2->bic to BIC1.
bfq_insert_request
-> by Process 1
bfqq = bfq_init_rq(rq)
bfqq = bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split
bfqq = bic_to_bfqq
-> get bfqq2 from BIC1
bfqq->ref++
rq->elv.priv[0] = bic
rq->elv.priv[1] = bfqq
if (bfqq_process_refs(bfqq) == 1)
bfqq->bic = bic
-> record BIC1 to bfqq2
__bfq_insert_request
new_bfqq = bfq_setup_cooperator
-> get bfqq3 from bfqq2->new_bfqq
bfqq_request_freed(bfqq)
new_bfqq->ref++
rq->elv.priv[1] = new_bfqq
-> handle IO by bfqq3
Fix the problem by checking bfqq is from merge chain fist. And this
might fix a following problem reported by our syzkaller(unreproducible):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_do_early_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5692 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_do_or_sched_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5805 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_get_queue+0x25b0/0x2610 block/bfq-iosched.c:5889
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888123839eb8 by task kworker/0:1H/18595
CPU: 0 PID: 18595 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G L 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_requeue_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
print_report+0x10d/0x610 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0x8e/0xc0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
bfq_do_early_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5692 [inline]
bfq_do_or_sched_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5805 [inline]
bfq_get_queue+0x25b0/0x2610 block/bfq-iosched.c:5889
bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x169/0x5d0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6757
bfq_init_rq block/bfq-iosched.c:6876 [inline]
bfq_insert_request block/bfq-iosched.c:6254 [inline]
bfq_insert_requests+0x1112/0x5cf0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6304
blk_mq_insert_request+0x290/0x8d0 block/blk-mq.c:2593
blk_mq_requeue_work+0x6bc/0xa70 block/blk-mq.c:1502
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305
</TASK>
Allocated by task 20776:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:763 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3458 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1a4/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3503
ioc_create_icq block/blk-ioc.c:370 [inline]
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: avoid OOB when system.data xattr changes underneath the filesystem
When looking up for an entry in an inlined directory, if e_value_offs is
changed underneath the filesystem by some change in the block device, it
will lead to an out-of-bounds access that KASAN detects as an UAF.
EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 r/w without journal. Quota mode: none.
loop0: detected capacity change from 2048 to 2047
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_search_dir+0xf2/0x1c0 fs/ext4/namei.c:1500
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88803e91130f by task syz-executor269/5103
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5103 Comm: syz-executor269 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
ext4_search_dir+0xf2/0x1c0 fs/ext4/namei.c:1500
ext4_find_inline_entry+0x4be/0x5e0 fs/ext4/inline.c:1697
__ext4_find_entry+0x2b4/0x1b30 fs/ext4/namei.c:1573
ext4_lookup_entry fs/ext4/namei.c:1727 [inline]
ext4_lookup+0x15f/0x750 fs/ext4/namei.c:1795
lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x11f/0x260 fs/namei.c:1633
filename_create+0x297/0x540 fs/namei.c:3980
do_symlinkat+0xf9/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4587
__do_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4610 [inline]
__se_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4607 [inline]
__x64_sys_symlinkat+0x95/0xb0 fs/namei.c:4607
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f3e73ced469
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 21 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff4d40c258 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000010a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0032656c69662f2e RCX: 00007f3e73ced469
RDX: 0000000020000200 RSI: 00000000ffffff9c RDI: 00000000200001c0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fff4d40c290 R09: 00007fff4d40c290
R10: 0023706f6f6c2f76 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff4d40c27c
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007fff4d40c2b0
</TASK>
Calling ext4_xattr_ibody_find right after reading the inode with
ext4_get_inode_loc will lead to a check of the validity of the xattrs,
avoiding this problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/iwcm: Fix WARNING:at_kernel/workqueue.c:#check_flush_dependency
In the commit aee2424246f9 ("RDMA/iwcm: Fix a use-after-free related to
destroying CM IDs"), the function flush_workqueue is invoked to flush the
work queue iwcm_wq.
But at that time, the work queue iwcm_wq was created via the function
alloc_ordered_workqueue without the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM.
Because the current process is trying to flush the whole iwcm_wq, if
iwcm_wq doesn't have the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, verify that the current
process is not reclaiming memory or running on a workqueue which doesn't
have the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM as that can break forward-progress guarantee
leading to a deadlock.
The call trace is as below:
[ 125.350876][ T1430] Call Trace:
[ 125.356281][ T1430] <TASK>
[ 125.361285][ T1430] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:693)
[ 125.367640][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9))
[ 125.375689][ T1430] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:180 lib/bug.c:219)
[ 125.382505][ T1430] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:239)
[ 125.388987][ T1430] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260 (discriminator 1))
[ 125.395831][ T1430] ? asm_exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621)
[ 125.403125][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9))
[ 125.410984][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9))
[ 125.418764][ T1430] __flush_workqueue (kernel/workqueue.c:3970)
[ 125.426021][ T1430] ? __pfx___might_resched (kernel/sched/core.c:10151)
[ 125.433431][ T1430] ? destroy_cm_id (drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c:375) iw_cm
[ 125.441209][ T1430] ? __pfx___flush_workqueue (kernel/workqueue.c:3910)
[ 125.473900][ T1430] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 include/linux/spinlock.h:187 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162)
[ 125.473909][ T1430] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:161)
[ 125.482537][ T1430] _destroy_id (drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2044) rdma_cm
[ 125.495072][ T1430] nvme_rdma_free_queue (drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:656 drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:650) nvme_rdma
[ 125.505827][ T1430] nvme_rdma_reset_ctrl_work (drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:2180) nvme_rdma
[ 125.505831][ T1430] process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3231)
[ 125.515122][ T1430] worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3306 kernel/workqueue.c:3393)
[ 125.515127][ T1430] ? __pfx_worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3339)
[ 125.531837][ T1430] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389)
[ 125.539864][ T1430] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:342)
[ 125.550628][ T1430] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147)
[ 125.558840][ T1430] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:342)
[ 125.558844][ T1430] ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257)
[ 125.566487][ T1430] </TASK>
[ 125.566488][ T1430] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netem: fix return value if duplicate enqueue fails
There is a bug in netem_enqueue() introduced by
commit 5845f706388a ("net: netem: fix skb length BUG_ON in __skb_to_sgvec")
that can lead to a use-after-free.
This commit made netem_enqueue() always return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS
when a packet is duplicated, which can cause the parent qdisc's q.qlen
to be mistakenly incremented. When this happens qlen_notify() may be
skipped on the parent during destruction, leaving a dangling pointer
for some classful qdiscs like DRR.
There are two ways for the bug happen:
- If the duplicated packet is dropped by rootq->enqueue() and then
the original packet is also dropped.
- If rootq->enqueue() sends the duplicated packet to a different qdisc
and the original packet is dropped.
In both cases NET_XMIT_SUCCESS is returned even though no packets
are enqueued at the netem qdisc.
The fix is to defer the enqueue of the duplicate packet until after
the original packet has been guaranteed to return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent UAF in ip6_send_skb()
syzbot reported an UAF in ip6_send_skb() [1]
After ip6_local_out() has returned, we no longer can safely
dereference rt, unless we hold rcu_read_lock().
A similar issue has been fixed in commit
a688caa34beb ("ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc()")
Another potential issue in ip6_finish_output2() is handled in a
separate patch.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806dde4858 by task syz.1.380/6530
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6530 Comm: syz.1.380 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00306-gdf6cbc62cc9b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588
rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160
do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890
vfs_writev+0x37c/0xbb0 fs/read_write.c:971
do_writev+0x1b1/0x350 fs/read_write.c:1018
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f936bf79e79
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f936cd7f038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f936c115f80 RCX: 00007f936bf79e79
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f936bfe7916 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f936c115f80 R15: 00007fff2860a7a8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6530:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4044
dst_alloc+0x12b/0x190 net/core/dst.c:89
ip6_blackhole_route+0x59/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2670
make_blackhole net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3120 [inline]
xfrm_lookup_route+0xd1/0x1c0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3313
ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x13e/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1257
rawv6_sendmsg+0x1283/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:898
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 45:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x145/0x350 mm/slub.c:4548
dst_destroy+0x2ac/0x460 net/core/dst.c:124
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2569 [inline]
rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
leds: trigger: Unregister sysfs attributes before calling deactivate()
Triggers which have trigger specific sysfs attributes typically store
related data in trigger-data allocated by the activate() callback and
freed by the deactivate() callback.
Calling device_remove_groups() after calling deactivate() leaves a window
where the sysfs attributes show/store functions could be called after
deactivation and then operate on the just freed trigger-data.
Move the device_remove_groups() call to before deactivate() to close
this race window.
This also makes the deactivation path properly do things in reverse order
of the activation path which calls the activate() callback before calling
device_add_groups(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/DPC: Fix use-after-free on concurrent DPC and hot-removal
Keith reports a use-after-free when a DPC event occurs concurrently to
hot-removal of the same portion of the hierarchy:
The dpc_handler() awaits readiness of the secondary bus below the
Downstream Port where the DPC event occurred. To do so, it polls the
config space of the first child device on the secondary bus. If that
child device is concurrently removed, accesses to its struct pci_dev
cause the kernel to oops.
That's because pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() neglects to hold a
reference on the child device. Before v6.3, the function was only
called on resume from system sleep or on runtime resume. Holding a
reference wasn't necessary back then because the pciehp IRQ thread
could never run concurrently. (On resume from system sleep, IRQs are
not enabled until after the resume_noirq phase. And runtime resume is
always awaited before a PCI device is removed.)
However starting with v6.3, pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() is also
called on a DPC event. Commit 53b54ad074de ("PCI/DPC: Await readiness
of secondary bus after reset"), which introduced that, failed to
appreciate that pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() now needs to hold a
reference on the child device because dpc_handler() and pciehp may
indeed run concurrently. The commit was backported to v5.10+ stable
kernels, so that's the oldest one affected.
Add the missing reference acquisition.
Abridged stack trace:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000091400c0
CPU: 15 PID: 2464 Comm: irq/53-pcie-dpc 6.9.0
RIP: pci_bus_read_config_dword+0x17/0x50
pci_dev_wait()
pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus()
dpc_reset_link()
pcie_do_recovery()
dpc_handler() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netns: Make get_net_ns() handle zero refcount net
Syzkaller hit a warning:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 7890 Comm: tun Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00100-gcaa4f9578aba-dirty #310
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
Code: 41 49 04 31 ff 89 de e8 9f 1e cd fe 84 db 75 9c e8 76 26 cd fe c6 05 b6 41 49 04 01 90 48 c7 c7 b8 8e 25 86 e8 d2 05 b5 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 79 ff ff ff e8 53 26 cd fe 0f b6 1
RSP: 0018:ffff8881067b7da0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff811c72ac
RDX: ffff8881026a2140 RSI: ffffffff811c72b5 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8881067b7db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 205b5d3730353139
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 205d303938375420 R12: ffff8881086500c4
R13: ffff8881086500c4 R14: ffff8881086500b0 R15: ffff888108650040
FS: 00007f5b2961a4c0(0000) GS:ffff88823bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055d7ed36fd18 CR3: 00000001482f6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0xa3/0xc0
? __warn+0xa5/0x1c0
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
? report_bug+0x1fc/0x2d0
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
? handle_bug+0xa1/0x110
? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0xb0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? __warn_printk+0xcc/0x140
? __warn_printk+0xd5/0x140
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
get_net_ns+0xa4/0xc0
? __pfx_get_net_ns+0x10/0x10
open_related_ns+0x5a/0x130
__tun_chr_ioctl+0x1616/0x2370
? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0
? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2+0x1c/0x30
? __pfx_tun_chr_ioctl+0x10/0x10
tun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x11b/0x160
x64_sys_call+0x1211/0x20d0
do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5b28f165d7
Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 b1 48 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 8
RSP: 002b:00007ffc2b59c5e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5b28f165d7
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000054e3 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffc2b59c650 R08: 00007f5b291ed8c0 R09: 00007f5b2961a4c0
R10: 0000000029690010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400730
R13: 00007ffc2b59cf40 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
This is trigger as below:
ns0 ns1
tun_set_iff() //dev is tun0
tun->dev = dev
//ip link set tun0 netns ns1
put_net() //ref is 0
__tun_chr_ioctl() //TUNGETDEVNETNS
net = dev_net(tun->dev);
open_related_ns(&net->ns, get_net_ns); //ns1
get_net_ns()
get_net() //addition on 0
Use maybe_get_net() in get_net_ns in case net's ref is zero to fix this |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ipset: Fix race between namespace cleanup and gc in the list:set type
Lion Ackermann reported that there is a race condition between namespace cleanup
in ipset and the garbage collection of the list:set type. The namespace
cleanup can destroy the list:set type of sets while the gc of the set type is
waiting to run in rcu cleanup. The latter uses data from the destroyed set which
thus leads use after free. The patch contains the following parts:
- When destroying all sets, first remove the garbage collectors, then wait
if needed and then destroy the sets.
- Fix the badly ordered "wait then remove gc" for the destroy a single set
case.
- Fix the missing rcu locking in the list:set type in the userspace test
case.
- Use proper RCU list handlings in the list:set type.
The patch depends on c1193d9bbbd3 (netfilter: ipset: Add list flush to cancel_gc). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ionic: fix use after netif_napi_del()
When queues are started, netif_napi_add() and napi_enable() are called.
If there are 4 queues and only 3 queues are used for the current
configuration, only 3 queues' napi should be registered and enabled.
The ionic_qcq_enable() checks whether the .poll pointer is not NULL for
enabling only the using queue' napi. Unused queues' napi will not be
registered by netif_napi_add(), so the .poll pointer indicates NULL.
But it couldn't distinguish whether the napi was unregistered or not
because netif_napi_del() doesn't reset the .poll pointer to NULL.
So, ionic_qcq_enable() calls napi_enable() for the queue, which was
unregistered by netif_napi_del().
Reproducer:
ethtool -L <interface name> rx 1 tx 1 combined 0
ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 1
ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 4
Splat looks like:
kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6666!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 PID: 1057 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #16
Workqueue: events ionic_lif_deferred_work [ionic]
RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
Code: 48 89 c2 48 83 e2 f6 80 b9 61 09 00 00 00 74 0d 48 83 bf 60 01 00 00 00 74 03 80 ce 01 f0 4f
RSP: 0018:ffffb6ed83227d48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff97560cda0828 RCX: 0000000000000029
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff97560cda0a28
RBP: ffffb6ed83227d50 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff97560ce3c1a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff975613ba0a20
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff975d5f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8f734ee200 CR3: 0000000103e50000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die+0x33/0x90
? do_trap+0xd9/0x100
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
? do_error_trap+0x83/0xb0
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
ionic_qcq_enable+0xb7/0x180 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]
ionic_start_queues+0xc4/0x290 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]
ionic_link_status_check+0x11c/0x170 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]
ionic_lif_deferred_work+0x129/0x280 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]
process_one_work+0x145/0x360
worker_thread+0x2bb/0x3d0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xcc/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: fix invalid unregister error path
The error path of seg6_init() is wrong in case CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL
is not defined. In that case if seg6_hmac_init() fails, the
genl_unregister_family() isn't called.
This issue exist since commit 46738b1317e1 ("ipv6: sr: add option to control
lwtunnel support"), and commit 5559cea2d5aa ("ipv6: sr: fix possible
use-after-free and null-ptr-deref") replaced unregister_pernet_subsys()
with genl_unregister_family() in this error path. |
