| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: use RCU protection in __ip_rt_update_pmtu()
__ip_rt_update_pmtu() must use RCU protection to make
sure the net structure it reads does not disappear. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: prevent adding a device which is already a team device lower
Prevent adding a device which is already a team device lower,
e.g. adding veth0 if vlan1 was already added and veth0 is a lower of
vlan1.
This is not useful in practice and can lead to recursive locking:
$ ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
$ ip link set veth0 up
$ ip link set veth1 up
$ ip link add link veth0 name veth0.1 type vlan protocol 802.1Q id 1
$ ip link add team0 type team
$ ip link set veth0.1 down
$ ip link set veth0.1 master team0
team0: Port device veth0.1 added
$ ip link set veth0 down
$ ip link set veth0 master team0
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.13.0-rc2-virtme-00441-ga14a429069bb #46 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
ip/7684 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888016848e00 (team->team_lock_key){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888016848e00 (team->team_lock_key){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: team_add_slave (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1147 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1977)
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(team->team_lock_key);
lock(team->team_lock_key);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
2 locks held by ip/7684:
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 7684 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-virtme-00441-ga14a429069bb #46
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
print_deadlock_bug.cold (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3040)
__lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3893 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226)
? netlink_broadcast_filtered (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1548)
lock_acquire.part.0 (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
? trace_lock_acquire (./include/trace/events/lock.h:24 (discriminator 2))
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5822)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
__mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 kernel/locking/mutex.c:735)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
? fib_sync_up (net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:2167)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
notifier_call_chain (kernel/notifier.c:85)
call_netdevice_notifiers_info (net/core/dev.c:1996)
__dev_notify_flags (net/core/dev.c:8993)
? __dev_change_flags (net/core/dev.c:8975)
dev_change_flags (net/core/dev.c:9027)
vlan_device_event (net/8021q/vlan.c:85 net/8021q/vlan.c:470)
? br_device_event (net/bridge/br.c:143)
notifier_call_chain (kernel/notifier.c:85)
call_netdevice_notifiers_info (net/core/dev.c:1996)
dev_open (net/core/dev.c:1519 net/core/dev.c:1505)
team_add_slave (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1219 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1977)
? __pfx_team_add_slave (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1972)
do_set_master (net/core/rtnetlink.c:2917)
do_setlink.isra.0 (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3117) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: xilinx - call finalize with bh disabled
When calling crypto_finalize_request, BH should be disabled to avoid
triggering the following calltrace:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 74 at crypto/crypto_engine.c:58 crypto_finalize_request+0xa0/0x118
Modules linked in: cryptodev(O)
CPU: 2 PID: 74 Comm: firmware:zynqmp Tainted: G O 6.8.0-rc1-yocto-standard #323
Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.0 (DT)
pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : crypto_finalize_request+0xa0/0x118
lr : crypto_finalize_request+0x104/0x118
sp : ffffffc085353ce0
x29: ffffffc085353ce0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff8808ea8688
x26: ffffffc081715038 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff880100db00
x23: ffffff880100da80 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffffff8805b14000 x19: ffffff880100da80 x18: 0000000000010450
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffff880100dad0
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffffc0832dcd08 x9 : ffffffc0812416d8
x8 : 00000000000001f4 x7 : ffffffc0830d2830 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffffc082091000 x4 : ffffffc082091658 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffffffc7f9653000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8802d20000
Call trace:
crypto_finalize_request+0xa0/0x118
crypto_finalize_aead_request+0x18/0x30
zynqmp_handle_aes_req+0xcc/0x388
crypto_pump_work+0x168/0x2d8
kthread_worker_fn+0xfc/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x138
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
irq event stamp: 40
hardirqs last enabled at (39): [<ffffffc0812416f8>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x70/0xb0
hardirqs last disabled at (40): [<ffffffc08122d208>] el1_dbg+0x28/0x90
softirqs last enabled at (36): [<ffffffc080017dec>] kernel_neon_begin+0x8c/0xf0
softirqs last disabled at (34): [<ffffffc080017dc0>] kernel_neon_begin+0x60/0xf0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: Shuffle the tx ring before enabling tx
Quanyang observed that when using an NFS rootfs on an AMD ZynqMp board,
the rootfs may take an extended time to recover after a suspend.
Upon investigation, it was determined that the issue originates from a
problem in the macb driver.
According to the Zynq UltraScale TRM [1], when transmit is disabled,
the transmit buffer queue pointer resets to point to the address
specified by the transmit buffer queue base address register.
In the current implementation, the code merely resets `queue->tx_head`
and `queue->tx_tail` to '0'. This approach presents several issues:
- Packets already queued in the tx ring are silently lost,
leading to memory leaks since the associated skbs cannot be released.
- Concurrent write access to `queue->tx_head` and `queue->tx_tail` may
occur from `macb_tx_poll()` or `macb_start_xmit()` when these values
are reset to '0'.
- The transmission may become stuck on a packet that has already been sent
out, with its 'TX_USED' bit set, but has not yet been processed. However,
due to the manipulation of 'queue->tx_head' and 'queue->tx_tail',
`macb_tx_poll()` incorrectly assumes there are no packets to handle
because `queue->tx_head == queue->tx_tail`. This issue is only resolved
when a new packet is placed at this position. This is the root cause of
the prolonged recovery time observed for the NFS root filesystem.
To resolve this issue, shuffle the tx ring and tx skb array so that
the first unsent packet is positioned at the start of the tx ring.
Additionally, ensure that updates to `queue->tx_head` and
`queue->tx_tail` are properly protected with the appropriate lock.
[1] https://docs.amd.com/v/u/en-US/ug1085-zynq-ultrascale-trm |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: sar: drop lockdep assertion in rtw89_set_sar_from_acpi
The following assertion is triggered on the rtw89 driver startup. It
looks meaningless to hold wiphy lock on the early init stage so drop the
assertion.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 629 at drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/sar.c:502 rtw89_set_sar_from_acpi+0x365/0x4d0 [rtw89_core]
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 629 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.15.0+ #29 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: LENOVO 21D0/LNVNB161216, BIOS J6CN50WW 09/27/2024
RIP: 0010:rtw89_set_sar_from_acpi+0x365/0x4d0 [rtw89_core]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtw89_sar_init+0x68/0x2c0 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_core_init+0x188e/0x1e50 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_pci_probe+0x530/0xb50 [rtw89_pci]
local_pci_probe+0xd9/0x190
pci_call_probe+0x183/0x540
pci_device_probe+0x171/0x2c0
really_probe+0x1e1/0x890
__driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x390
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
__driver_attach+0x1a0/0x530
bus_for_each_dev+0x10b/0x190
bus_add_driver+0x2eb/0x540
driver_register+0x1a3/0x3a0
do_one_initcall+0xd5/0x450
do_init_module+0x2cc/0x8f0
init_module_from_file+0xe1/0x150
idempotent_init_module+0x226/0x760
__x64_sys_finit_module+0xcd/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x94/0x380
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: Drop the lock in skb_may_tx_timestamp()
skb_may_tx_timestamp() may acquire sock::sk_callback_lock. The lock must
not be taken in IRQ context, only softirq is okay. A few drivers receive
the timestamp via a dedicated interrupt and complete the TX timestamp
from that handler. This will lead to a deadlock if the lock is already
write-locked on the same CPU.
Taking the lock can be avoided. The socket (pointed by the skb) will
remain valid until the skb is released. The ->sk_socket and ->file
member will be set to NULL once the user closes the socket which may
happen before the timestamp arrives.
If we happen to observe the pointer while the socket is closing but
before the pointer is set to NULL then we may use it because both
pointer (and the file's cred member) are RCU freed.
Drop the lock. Use READ_ONCE() to obtain the individual pointer. Add a
matching WRITE_ONCE() where the pointer are cleared. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix locking usage for tcon fields
We used to use the cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of objects
that are not just the server, ses or tcon lists. We later introduced
srv_lock, ses_lock and tc_lock to protect fields within the
corresponding structs. This was done to provide a more granular
protection and avoid unnecessary serialization.
There were still a couple of uses of cifs_tcp_ses_lock to provide
tcon fields. In this patch, I've replaced them with tc_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: move wait_on_sem() out of spinlock
With iommu.strict=1, the existing completion wait path can cause soft
lockups under stressed environment, as wait_on_sem() busy-waits under the
spinlock with interrupts disabled.
Move the completion wait in iommu_completion_wait() out of the spinlock.
wait_on_sem() only polls the hardware-updated cmd_sem and does not require
iommu->lock, so holding the lock during the busy wait unnecessarily
increases contention and extends the time with interrupts disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/tests: shmem: Hold reservation lock around purge
Acquire and release the GEM object's reservation lock around calls
to the object's purge operation. The tests use
drm_gem_shmem_purge_locked(), which led to errors such as show below.
[ 58.709128] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1354 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:515 drm_gem_shmem_purge_locked+0x51c/0x740
Only export the new helper drm_gem_shmem_purge() for Kunit tests.
This is not an interface for regular drivers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/tests: shmem: Hold reservation lock around vmap/vunmap
Acquire and release the GEM object's reservation lock around vmap and
vunmap operations. The tests use vmap_locked, which led to errors such
as show below.
[ 122.292030] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1413 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:390 drm_gem_shmem_vmap_locked+0x3a3/0x6f0
[ 122.468066] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1413 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:293 drm_gem_shmem_pin_locked+0x1fe/0x350
[ 122.563504] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1413 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:234 drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_locked+0x23c/0x370
[ 122.662248] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1413 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:452 drm_gem_shmem_vunmap_locked+0x101/0x330
Only export the new vmap/vunmap helpers for Kunit tests. These are
not interfaces for regular drivers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spidev: fix lock inversion between spi_lock and buf_lock
The spidev driver previously used two mutexes, spi_lock and buf_lock,
but acquired them in different orders depending on the code path:
write()/read(): buf_lock -> spi_lock
ioctl(): spi_lock -> buf_lock
This AB-BA locking pattern triggers lockdep warnings and can
cause real deadlocks:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
spidev_ioctl() -> mutex_lock(&spidev->buf_lock)
spidev_sync_write() -> mutex_lock(&spidev->spi_lock)
*** DEADLOCK ***
The issue is reproducible with a simple userspace program that
performs write() and SPI_IOC_WR_MAX_SPEED_HZ ioctl() calls from
separate threads on the same spidev file descriptor.
Fix this by simplifying the locking model and removing the lock
inversion entirely. spidev_sync() no longer performs any locking,
and all callers serialize access using spi_lock.
buf_lock is removed since its functionality is fully covered by
spi_lock, eliminating the possibility of lock ordering issues.
This removes the lock inversion and prevents deadlocks without
changing userspace ABI or behaviour. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: Fix a hmm_range_fault() livelock / starvation problem
If hmm_range_fault() fails a folio_trylock() in do_swap_page,
trying to acquire the lock of a device-private folio for migration,
to ram, the function will spin until it succeeds grabbing the lock.
However, if the process holding the lock is depending on a work
item to be completed, which is scheduled on the same CPU as the
spinning hmm_range_fault(), that work item might be starved and
we end up in a livelock / starvation situation which is never
resolved.
This can happen, for example if the process holding the
device-private folio lock is stuck in
migrate_device_unmap()->lru_add_drain_all()
sinc lru_add_drain_all() requires a short work-item
to be run on all online cpus to complete.
A prerequisite for this to happen is:
a) Both zone device and system memory folios are considered in
migrate_device_unmap(), so that there is a reason to call
lru_add_drain_all() for a system memory folio while a
folio lock is held on a zone device folio.
b) The zone device folio has an initial mapcount > 1 which causes
at least one migration PTE entry insertion to be deferred to
try_to_migrate(), which can happen after the call to
lru_add_drain_all().
c) No or voluntary only preemption.
This all seems pretty unlikely to happen, but indeed is hit by
the "xe_exec_system_allocator" igt test.
Resolve this by waiting for the folio to be unlocked if the
folio_trylock() fails in do_swap_page().
Rename migration_entry_wait_on_locked() to
softleaf_entry_wait_unlock() and update its documentation to
indicate the new use-case.
Future code improvements might consider moving
the lru_add_drain_all() call in migrate_device_unmap() to be
called *after* all pages have migration entries inserted.
That would eliminate also b) above.
v2:
- Instead of a cond_resched() in hmm_range_fault(),
eliminate the problem by waiting for the folio to be unlocked
in do_swap_page() (Alistair Popple, Andrew Morton)
v3:
- Add a stub migration_entry_wait_on_locked() for the
!CONFIG_MIGRATION case. (Kernel Test Robot)
v4:
- Rename migrate_entry_wait_on_locked() to
softleaf_entry_wait_on_locked() and update docs (Alistair Popple)
v5:
- Add a WARN_ON_ONCE() for the !CONFIG_MIGRATION
version of softleaf_entry_wait_on_locked().
- Modify wording around function names in the commit message
(Andrew Morton)
(cherry picked from commit a69d1ab971a624c6f112cea61536569d579c3215) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in hci_le_remote_conn_param_req_evt
hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in
hci_le_remote_conn_param_req_evt, otherwise it's possible it is freed
concurrently.
Extend the hci_dev_lock critical section to cover all conn usage. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: read UNIX_DIAG_VFS data under unix_state_lock
Exact UNIX diag lookups hold a reference to the socket, but not to
u->path. Meanwhile, unix_release_sock() clears u->path under
unix_state_lock() and drops the path reference after unlocking.
Read the inode and device numbers for UNIX_DIAG_VFS while holding
unix_state_lock(), then emit the netlink attribute after dropping the
lock.
This keeps the VFS data stable while the reply is being built. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: save ailp before dropping the AIL lock in push callbacks
In xfs_inode_item_push() and xfs_qm_dquot_logitem_push(), the AIL lock
is dropped to perform buffer IO. Once the cluster buffer no longer
protects the log item from reclaim, the log item may be freed by
background reclaim or the dquot shrinker. The subsequent spin_lock()
call dereferences lip->li_ailp, which is a use-after-free.
Fix this by saving the ailp pointer in a local variable while the AIL
lock is held and the log item is guaranteed to be valid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: enforce device_lock for driver_match_device()
Currently, driver_match_device() is called from three sites. One site
(__device_attach_driver) holds device_lock(dev), but the other two
(bind_store and __driver_attach) do not. This inconsistency means that
bus match() callbacks are not guaranteed to be called with the lock
held.
Fix this by introducing driver_match_device_locked(), which guarantees
holding the device lock using a scoped guard. Replace the unlocked calls
in bind_store() and __driver_attach() with this new helper. Also add a
lock assertion to driver_match_device() to enforce this guarantee.
This consistency also fixes a known race condition. The driver_override
implementation relies on the device_lock, so the missing lock led to the
use-after-free (UAF) reported in Bugzilla for buses using this field.
Stress testing the two newly locked paths for 24 hours with
CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING and CONFIG_LOCKDEP enabled showed no UAF recurrence
and no lockdep warnings. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250: Fix TX deadlock when using DMA
`dmaengine_terminate_async` does not guarantee that the
`__dma_tx_complete` callback will run. The callback is currently the
only place where `dma->tx_running` gets cleared. If the transaction is
canceled and the callback never runs, then `dma->tx_running` will never
get cleared and we will never schedule new TX DMA transactions again.
This change makes it so we clear `dma->tx_running` after we terminate
the DMA transaction. This is "safe" because `serial8250_tx_dma_flush`
is holding the UART port lock. The first thing the callback does is also
grab the UART port lock, so access to `dma->tx_running` is serialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_hid: don't call cdev_init while cdev in use
When calling unbind, then bind again, cdev_init reinitialized the cdev,
even though there may still be references to it. That's the case when
the /dev/hidg* device is still opened. This obviously unsafe behavior
like oopes.
This fixes this by using cdev_alloc to put the cdev on the heap. That
way, we can simply allocate a new one in hidg_bind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: use generic driver_override infrastructure
When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match()
callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the
driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.
Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking
care of proper locking internally.
Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock
held is intentional. [1]
Also note that we do not enable the driver_override feature of struct
bus_type, as SPI - in contrast to most other buses - passes "" to
sysfs_emit() when the driver_override pointer is NULL. Thus, printing
"\n" instead of "(null)\n". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Protect *all* of sev_mem_enc_register_region() with kvm->lock
Take and hold kvm->lock for before checking sev_guest() in
sev_mem_enc_register_region(), as sev_guest() isn't stable unless kvm->lock
is held (or KVM can guarantee KVM_SEV_INIT{2} has completed and can't
rollack state). If KVM_SEV_INIT{2} fails, KVM can end up trying to add to
a not-yet-initialized sev->regions_list, e.g. triggering a #GP
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 110 UID: 0 PID: 72717 Comm: syz.15.11462 Tainted: G U W O 6.16.0-smp-DEV #1 NONE
Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.52.0-0 10/28/2024
RIP: 0010:sev_mem_enc_register_region+0x3f0/0x4f0 ../include/linux/list.h:83
Code: <41> 80 3c 04 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 f1 c7 a2 00 49 39 ed 0f 84 c6 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88838647fbb8 EFLAGS: 00010256
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92015cf1e0b RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: ffff888367870000
RBP: ffffc900ae78f050 R08: ffffea000d9e0007 R09: 1ffffd4001b3c000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff94001b3c001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8982ab0bde00 R14: ffffc900ae78f058 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f34e9dc66c0(0000) GS:ffff89ee64d33000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe180adef98 CR3: 000000047210e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0xa72/0x1240 ../arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7371
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x649/0x990 ../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5363
__se_sys_ioctl+0x101/0x170 ../fs/ioctl.c:51
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x1f0 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f34e9f7e9a9
Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f34e9dc6038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f34ea1a6080 RCX: 00007f34e9f7e9a9
RDX: 0000200000000280 RSI: 000000008010aebb RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007f34ea000d69 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f34ea1a6080 R15: 00007ffce77197a8
</TASK>
with a syzlang reproducer that looks like:
syz_kvm_add_vcpu$x86(0x0, &(0x7f0000000040)={0x0, &(0x7f0000000180)=ANY=[], 0x70}) (async)
syz_kvm_add_vcpu$x86(0x0, &(0x7f0000000080)={0x0, &(0x7f0000000180)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="..."], 0x4f}) (async)
r0 = openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000200), 0x0, 0x0)
r1 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VM(r0, 0xae01, 0x0)
r2 = openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000240), 0x0, 0x0)
r3 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VM(r2, 0xae01, 0x0)
ioctl$KVM_SET_CLOCK(r3, 0xc008aeba, &(0x7f0000000040)={0x1, 0x8, 0x0, 0x5625e9b0}) (async)
ioctl$KVM_SET_PIT2(r3, 0x8010aebb, &(0x7f0000000280)={[...], 0x5}) (async)
ioctl$KVM_SET_PIT2(r1, 0x4070aea0, 0x0) (async)
r4 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VM(0xffffffffffffffff, 0xae01, 0x0)
openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0) (async)
ioctl$KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION(r4, 0x4020ae46, &(0x7f0000000400)={0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x2000, &(0x7f0000001000/0x2000)=nil}) (async)
r5 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r4, 0xae41, 0x2)
close(r0) (async)
openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0x8000, 0x0) (async)
ioctl$KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG(r5, 0x4048ae9b, &(0x7f0000000300)={0x4376ea830d46549b, 0x0, [0x46, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1000]}) (async)
ioctl$KVM_RUN(r5, 0xae80, 0x0)
Opportunistically use guard() to avoid having to define a new error label
and goto usage. |
