Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate the user's existing refresh-token sessions by default. The refresh-token invalidation step in the users-permissions and admin authentication controllers was conditional on a caller-supplied `deviceId`. When a password change or reset request did not include a `deviceId`, no refresh tokens were revoked, leaving every prior session active. An attacker who had previously obtained a refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, allowing persistent unauthorized access for the lifetime of the refresh token (up to 30 days by default). Rotating credentials no longer terminated an active attacker session, defeating password reset as a containment measure. The patch in version 5.33.3 invalidates all refresh tokens associated with the user on every password change and password reset, regardless of whether a `deviceId` is supplied. A new device-scoped session is then issued to the caller as part of the response.
Project Subscriptions
No data.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-hvp3-26wx-g2w4 | Strapi: Password Reset Does Not Revoke Existing Refresh Sessions |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 14 May 2026 19:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate the user's existing refresh-token sessions by default. The refresh-token invalidation step in the users-permissions and admin authentication controllers was conditional on a caller-supplied `deviceId`. When a password change or reset request did not include a `deviceId`, no refresh tokens were revoked, leaving every prior session active. An attacker who had previously obtained a refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, allowing persistent unauthorized access for the lifetime of the refresh token (up to 30 days by default). Rotating credentials no longer terminated an active attacker session, defeating password reset as a containment measure. The patch in version 5.33.3 invalidates all refresh tokens associated with the user on every password change and password reset, regardless of whether a `deviceId` is supplied. A new device-scoped session is then issued to the caller as part of the response. | |
| Title | Strapi: Password Reset Does Not Revoke Existing Refresh Sessions | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-613 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-14T18:38:26.745Z
Reserved: 2026-01-08T19:23:09.857Z
Link: CVE-2026-22706
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-05-14T19:16:30.700
Modified: 2026-05-14T19:16:30.700
Link: CVE-2026-22706
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-14T20:30:04Z
Weaknesses
Github GHSA