Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's SAML service provider implementation silently skips both SAML Response and Assertion signature validation when the configured IdP certificate field is empty. The verifySignatures routine performs an early return when serviceProviderOptions.cert is falsy, which is the default state of the setting. Because provider registration only gates on the SAML "enabled" toggle and not on the presence of a certificate, an administrator who enables SAML without pasting an IdP certificate obtains a fully wired, publicly reachable SAML login endpoint that accepts unsigned or attacker-supplied assertions. This is a default-configuration authentication-bypass class: the fail-open branch is reached with no misconfiguration beyond leaving a field at its shipped default. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.

Attack Vector Network

Attack Complexity Low

Privileges Required None

Attack Requirements None

User Interaction None

Vulnerable System Confidentiality Impact High

Vulnerable System Integrity Impact High

Vulnerable System Availability Impact Low

Subsequent System Confidentiality Impact None

Subsequent System Integrity Impact None

Subsequent System Availability Impact None

No CVSS v3.1

No CVSS v3.0

No CVSS v2

This CVE is not in the KEV list.

No EPSS score available.

Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.

Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).

Vendor Product Default status Versions
RocketChat Rocket.Chat affected
Version Status Constraints
>= 8.5.0-rc.0, < 8.5.0 affected —
>= 8.4.0-rc.0, < 8.4.1 affected —
>= 8.3.0-rc.0, < 8.3.3 affected —
>= 8.2.0-rc.0, < 8.2.3 affected —
>= 8.1.0-rc.0, < 8.1.4 affected —
>= 8.0.0-rc.0, < 8.0.5 affected —
>= 7.11.0-rc.0, < 7.13.7 affected —
< 7.10.11 affected —

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Project Subscriptions

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Advisories

No advisories yet.

Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.

Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

References
Link Providers
https://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat/security/advisories/GHSA-rgg7-qvp9-wvx7 cve-icon
History

Wed, 24 Jun 2026 21:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's SAML service provider implementation silently skips both SAML Response and Assertion signature validation when the configured IdP certificate field is empty. The verifySignatures routine performs an early return when serviceProviderOptions.cert is falsy, which is the default state of the setting. Because provider registration only gates on the SAML "enabled" toggle and not on the presence of a certificate, an administrator who enables SAML without pasting an IdP certificate obtains a fully wired, publicly reachable SAML login endpoint that accepts unsigned or attacker-supplied assertions. This is a default-configuration authentication-bypass class: the fail-open branch is reached with no misconfiguration beyond leaving a field at its shipped default. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
Title Rocket.Chat: SAML signature validation skipped when IdP certificate field is empty
Weaknesses CWE-347
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 9.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-06-24T20:58:57.909Z

Reserved: 2026-05-13T22:18:22.829Z

Link: CVE-2026-46423

cve-icon Vulnrichment

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cve-icon NVD

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cve-icon Redhat

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cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

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Weaknesses