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Search Results (2 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-8463 | 1 Leont | 1 Crypt\ | 2026-05-13 | 5.3 Medium |
| Crypt::Argon2 versions from 0.017 before 0.031 for Perl perform a heap out-of-bounds read in argon2_verify on empty encoded input. The auto-detect form of argon2_verify passes encoded_len - 1 as the length argument to memchr without checking that encoded_len is non-zero. When the encoded string is empty, the size_t subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX and memchr scans adjacent heap memory looking for a '$' separator byte. A caller that invokes argon2_verify against a stored hash that may legitimately be empty (for example a placeholder row or a NULL column materialised as an empty string) reads out-of-bounds heap memory, which can crash the process or leak the position of an adjacent '$' byte into subsequent parsing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-2597 | 1 Leont | 2 Crypt::sysrandom::xs, Crypt\ | 2026-04-18 | 7.5 High |
| Crypt::SysRandom::XS versions before 0.010 for Perl is vulnerable to a heap buffer overflow in the XS function random_bytes(). The function does not validate that the length parameter is non-negative. If a negative value (e.g. -1) is supplied, the expression length + 1u causes an integer wraparound, resulting in a zero-byte allocation. The subsequent call to chosen random function (e.g. getrandom) passes the original negative value, which is implicitly converted to a large unsigned value (typically SIZE_MAX). This can result in writes beyond the allocated buffer, leading to heap memory corruption and application crash (denial of service). In common usage, the length argument is typically hardcoded by the caller, which reduces the likelihood of attacker-controlled exploitation. Applications that pass untrusted input to this parameter may be affected. | ||||
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